# cow.fi domain hijack: a familiar address, unfamiliar requests

> For about 4.5 hours on 14 April 2026, attackers controlled the cow.fi domain and served a phishing site. Visitors who signed its requests lost tokens. The lesson: the address bar can be right while the request is wrong.

- Date: 2026-04-14
- Protocol: CoW Swap (cow.fi)
- Checked: 2026-11-04
- Review status: drafted with AI assistance, awaiting human review
- Canonical page: https://walletpermissions.com/incidents/cow-swap-domain-hijack-2026-04

## What the official source says

- Date: 14 April 2026 (CoW DAO, CIP-86, posted 23 April 2026)
- What was compromised: The domain registrar used by CoW Swap’s DNS holder, through social engineering. CoW DAO states CoW Swap itself “was not hacked”.
- Duration: “approximately 4.5 hours” of attacker control of the domain
- What users did: A phishing site “tricked cow.fi visitors into signing malicious transactions that drained tokens from their wallets”. Claim criteria refer to signing “a malicious message or transaction”.
- Estimated loss: “approximately 1.2M USDC worth of user funds” (core team estimate in CIP-86)

## Which kind of permission

CoW DAO’s forum post says victims signed malicious transactions or messages; it does not say which request types. Both kinds can move tokens: a transaction can carry an approval or transfer, and a signed message can be a permit or an order. These explainers cover the possibilities:

- [Send a transaction (eth_sendTransaction)](https://walletpermissions.com/learn/requests/send-transaction.md)
- [Token approval (ERC-20 approve)](https://walletpermissions.com/learn/requests/approve.md)
- [Permit signature (EIP-2612)](https://walletpermissions.com/learn/requests/permit.md)
- [Typed-data signature (eth_signTypedData_v4)](https://walletpermissions.com/learn/requests/sign-typed-data.md)

## What it let the attacker do

- Because the domain was the real one, the usual “check the URL” advice did not help during those hours.
- Whatever a visitor signed went to the attacker’s contract, not to CoW Swap.
- Signed approvals or permits could keep working after the domain was recovered, until revoked.

## A fictional replica of the prompt

A fictional replica, not the real prompt. It shows the kind of request a hijacked front end can show.

- Site in address bar: swap.example (the real, familiar domain)
- Request type: Signature: eth_signTypedData_v4
- Primary type: Permit
- Spender: An address you have not seen before
- Value: Maximum

If the spender in a prompt does not match what you expected from the app, the domain alone does not settle it.

## What to do now

- Follow the project’s official post first.
- Check approvals your real account gave around that time with Revoke.cash or Etherscan’s token approval checker.
- CoW DAO’s claim window for its grants program closed on 14 May 2026, per CIP-86.
- Official post: [CoW DAO forum: CIP-86](https://forum.cow.fi/t/cip-86-discretionary-grants-program-for-victims-of-the-cow-fi-domain-hijacking/3431)
- [Revoke.cash](https://revoke.cash/)
- [Etherscan token approval checker](https://etherscan.io/tokenapprovalchecker)

## Sources

- [CIP-86: Discretionary grants program for victims of the cow.fi domain hijacking](https://forum.cow.fi/t/cip-86-discretionary-grants-program-for-victims-of-the-cow-fi-domain-hijacking/3431). CoW DAO forum (official governance forum). Posted 2026-04-23. Checked 2026-11-04.
