walletpermissions
Incident explainer · April 14, 2026

cow.fi domain hijack: a familiar address, unfamiliar requests

For about 4.5 hours on 14 April 2026, attackers controlled the cow.fi domain and served a phishing site. Visitors who signed its requests lost tokens. The lesson: the address bar can be right while the request is wrong.

Education only. Facts on this page are quoted from the official source listed below, checked November 4, 2026. Drafted with AI assistance and awaiting human review. Markdown version

What the official source says

Date
14 April 2026 (CoW DAO, CIP-86, posted 23 April 2026)
What was compromised
The domain registrar used by CoW Swap’s DNS holder, through social engineering. CoW DAO states CoW Swap itself “was not hacked”.
Duration
“approximately 4.5 hours” of attacker control of the domain
What users did
A phishing site “tricked cow.fi visitors into signing malicious transactions that drained tokens from their wallets”. Claim criteria refer to signing “a malicious message or transaction”.
Estimated loss
“approximately 1.2M USDC worth of user funds” (core team estimate in CIP-86)

Which kind of permission

CoW DAO’s forum post says victims signed malicious transactions or messages; it does not say which request types. Both kinds can move tokens: a transaction can carry an approval or transfer, and a signed message can be a permit or an order. These explainers cover the possibilities:

What it let the attacker do

  • Because the domain was the real one, the usual “check the URL” advice did not help during those hours.
  • Whatever a visitor signed went to the attacker’s contract, not to CoW Swap.
  • Signed approvals or permits could keep working after the domain was recovered, until revoked.

A fictional replica of the prompt

A fictional replica, not the real prompt. It shows the kind of request a hijacked front end can show.

Fictional request card
Site in address bar
swap.example (the real, familiar domain)
Request type
Signature: eth_signTypedData_v4
Primary type
Permit
Spender
An address you have not seen before
Value
Maximum

If the spender in a prompt does not match what you expected from the app, the domain alone does not settle it.

What to do now

  • Follow the project’s official post first.
  • Check approvals your real account gave around that time with Revoke.cash or Etherscan’s token approval checker.
  • CoW DAO’s claim window for its grants program closed on 14 May 2026, per CIP-86.

Official post: CoW DAO forum: CIP-86

Sources

  1. CIP-86: Discretionary grants program for victims of the cow.fi domain hijacking. CoW DAO forum (official governance forum). Posted 2026-04-23. Checked 2026-11-04.

Quotes are from these sources. Found an error? Corrections are logged publicly on the changelog.